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a minor,
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·~

the Matter of· the Adoption of
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'
a minor.
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'1',
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· District, In And For Utah County, State Of Utah
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the :Jiatter of the Adoption of
. DIANE DEYERAUX,

Case No. 8055

a minor,
and
In the :Jia tter of the Adoption of
GEXE DEYERAFX,

Case No. 8056

a minor.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT
By order of this Court the appeal in connection with
the adoption proceedings of Diane Deveraux and Gene
Deveraux have been consolidated. The facts in each case
are identical with the exception of a slight difference concerning the nature of the individual children and their
reaction in foster homes and with their adopting parents.
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2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 31st day of August, 1950 the Juvenile Court
of the Third Judicial District, in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, made and entered its decree declaring that
the natural parents, Ellis Deveraux and Rhea Walker
Deveraux (Rhea Walker Brown, appellant), were unfit
and improper persons to have the care, custody, control
and guardianship of said children, committing the
children to the Utah Ntate Department of Public Welfare
for foster home care, treatment and supervision. The
decree, in part, states as follows:
'·IT IS FrRTHER ORDERED, by the Court
that said Larry, Blaine, Gene and Dianne Deveraux be and they (are) hereby declared and
adjudged to be dependent, neglected, children
within the 1neaning of the laws of Utah, in such
cases made and provided, and that subject to the
continuing jurisdiction of the Court, the said:
children be committed to the Utah State Department of Public Vvelfare for foster home care,
treatment, and supervision. And it is further
ordered by the Court that the father, Ellis
Deveroux pay $100.00 per month for their support
and maintenance." (Tr. 5-!, 246).
Thereafter the children were placed in the home of
:Mr. and Mrs. Lindberg (Tr. 134, 196, 214). Later on the
children were placed in different foster homes. On the
17th day of January, 1951 Gene Deveraux was placed in
the home of Clyde D. Sandgren and Zola M. S.andgren,
his wife (Tr. 140), and on the 6th day of February, 1951
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Diane DeYeraux \Ya.s placed 1n the hon1e of Ray Cole
:Stickney and Dona ~lerl Stickney, his wife (Tr. 140);
that on the 9th day of January, 1D51 Rhea Walker Brown,
fonnerly Rhea Deveraux, in the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State
of Utah, obtained a decree of divorce from the said
Elli.s Deverau.x (Tr. 65); that throughout the period of
time frmn 'vhen the children were taken from their
natural parents appellant, pursuant to the Juvenile Court
decree, made payrnents for their support ( Tr. 85),
inquired as to their well-being (Tr. 67) and asked to see
thern but was advised that the Welfare Department
thought it would be best for her 'not to visit with the
children (Tr. 78); that F. M. Alder, the Judge of the
Juvenile Court for the Third District, who acted as
attorney for appellant in her divorce suit, wrote to appellant on the lOth day of February, 1951 the following
letter:
".Jirs. Rhea Deveraux,
Tooele, Utah.
Dear l\[rs. Deveraux:
Thank you for the inclosure of the money
order, which completes final payment.
It is likely best that you have moved to
Tooele, and the other things that you mention
regarding your future are also desirable. Let me
suggest again, that after you are married, that
you AGAIN get married after the six months
have expired, so as to make your marriage legal.
Under the present conditions you should get marSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ried as soon as you can conveniently. Of course,
~'our future prospects and conduct will determine
the results as to the children.
You surely have my best wishes.
\' ery truly yours,
(signed) F. ~1. ALDER" (Tr. 244),
copy of \\'lti(·h wa~ submitted in evidence as Exhibit "2"
(Tr. 11-1-), and on the 11th day of ~fay, 1951 he again
wrote to appellant the following letter:
".:\l rs. Rhea Brown
Tooele
Utah

Dear

~Irs.

Brown:

The contents of your letter of .:\Iay 9th have been
read and noted. I am glad that you are married
and I wish you eYery suecess and all the happiness
that can be obtained in your marriage.
~.\s

to your children, don't worry about them
because the gossip about adoption by July cannot
I H' anything but gossip and ~-ou do not need to
worry about that as there is no time, within a
reasonable time, that such procedure ever occurs.
The best advice I can give you at the present time
is that you try to make your present marriage a
~nccess and let the future take care of itself as
it comes along. Your children are in good hands
so that you need not worry about their being
cared for.
The papers you asked for will have to be kept
here by me in my files so that they will be available to me at all times and if you got them you
might lose them..
'
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5
\Yishing you the best that life can afford, I
rmnain,
~inrerely

yours,

THIRD .TlTYENILE DISTRICT

corRT

(signed) F. 1\L ALDER
F. :.M. Alder
Judge"
(Tr. 2-1:3),
copy of which \Yas adn1itted in evidence as Exhibit "1"
(Tr. 11-1:).
That on April ~' 1952 the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah County, State
of l::-tah, entered a decree of adoption of the minor child
Gene DeYeraux (Tr. 4-5), and on the 4th day of June,
1952 said court entered a decree of adoption for the
child Diane Deveraux (Tr. 6-7). No notice of hearing
on the petition for the adoption in either case was given
to appellant and, in fact, the first knowledge that
the mother of said children had concerning said adoption
was a day or two after the adoption orders had been
entered (Tr. 65). Thereupon appellant immediately contacted 1\L Earl Marshall, then a practicing attorney in
Tooele, Utah (Tr. 66), and on or about the 8th day of
July, 195~ she filed in said District Court for the Fourth
.Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah,
a complaint seeking a writ of habeas corpus and custody
of the said children (Tr. 68, 126). This habeas corpus
matter has never been finally determined.
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That thereafter appellant was served with notice
that the two adoption matters would come up for hearing
on a <·<>rtain day and said matters came on for hearing
on F<>bruary -1-, 1953. At the hearing the decrees of
adoption heretofore entered by Judge Dunford and
.Judg<> Tuckett were vacated (Tr. 30). Testimony was
offered on behalf of petitioners concerning the. allegations in their petitions for adoption and the father of
said ehildren, Ellis E. Deveraux, executed his written
consent to the adoption of each child (Tr. 35, 55), and
it was stipulated that .J[r. and .Jlrs. Stickney and Mr.
and

~l rs.

Sandgren were fit and proper persons to adopt

the respective children (Tr. -1-!, 56).
Prior to the taking of testimony, and after the testimony above set forth was offered, appellant filed her
written motion (Diane Deveraux Tr. 9, Gene Deveraux
Tr. G) and made an oral motion (Tr. 52, 62) to dismiss
the petitions for adoption upon the following grounds:
( 1)

there was another action pending; (2) that the

Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction; (3) that the
consent for adoption had never been given by the natural
mother; and (-1) that the children had never been placed
in a children's aid society pursuant to Section 55-10-40,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, nor had the Juvenile Court
authorized the adoption pursuant to Section 55-10-43,
Utah Code Annotated 1953. These motions were denied
(Tr. 63) and further hearing was had in said matter.
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The eYidence di~rlo~es that after appellant had been
divorced fr01n her former husband she married her
present husband, HenryBrown (Tr. 65), and is living at
~tockton. rtah ( Tr. 6-±), and that she had changed her
manner of living by stopping her drinking (Tr. 77, 98).
It wa8 shown that she was a fit and proper person to
have the care and custody of her children (Tr. 94, 102,
108, 109). :Jir. Brown, husband of appellant, testified
that he made $5200.00 a year ( Tr. 92), that he was perfectly "\vi!Jing to have :Jirs. Brown have the children, and
that he would take care of them and treat them as his
own children ( Tr. 9-1).
:Mrs. Eloise :Jiorley, social worker, testified that
from a psychological point of view she thought it would
be again~t the interests of the children to have them
transferred frorn their present locations back to their
mother (Tr. 200). :Jirs. Elsa V. Harris, social worker,
testified to the same effect (Tr. 218). Dr. Walter T.
Hasler, who specializes in eye, nose and throat (Tr. 180),
gave his opinion as to the effect of moving Gene from
the Sandgren home (Tr. 183). On cross examination he
stated that the manner in which Gene was treated in the
future, if his home was changed, would have a great deal
of bearing on the matter (Tr. 184A). Mark K. Allen,
a psychologist and teacher at the Brigham Young University, gave his opinion that it would be detrimental to
move the children (Tr. 228-231). On cross examination
he stated that in some cases he thought the State should
have control of children and that if there was friction in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the home, or if there was not moral stability and the
(·hildren would get along a little better if taken out of
tlw l1ome of the natural parents, then the child should be
remov<'d ( Tr. ~:n-~:t~).
:\'mtwrou~ other witnesses te~tified as to the childn•n's l,('havior since being placed in the home of the
adopting parenb and as to their care and treatment in
~mid home~. .A~ it has already been stipulated that the
adopting parents are proper and fit persons to have the
<·ustody and control (Jf said children, we did not deem it
necessary or material to set forth in this statement of
l'ad~ where this testimony might be found.

On the 27th day of :Jlay, 1953 the court made and
entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree
in both of said matters (Diane Deveraux Tr. 17-22, Gene
Deveraux Tr. 15-20), granting the adoption of said children by the respective adopting parents.
STATE:JIEXT OF POINTS
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.

A.

The Juvenile Court Had Exclusive Jurisdiction of
The Care, Custody And Control Of The Minor
Children.

B.

The Natural Parents Had Not Been Permanently
Deprived Of The Custody Of The Minor Children.

C.

Written Consent For Adoption Is Required From
The Natural Mother Or, If Not, From The Juvenile
Court Or Children's Aid Society.
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II.

THE \YELFARE OF A CHILD IS NOT THE
ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE COURT
HAS JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY TO PERMIT AN
ADOPTION.

P~-\RAMOUNT

III. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
IN EVIDENCE THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V AND DECREE AND JUDGMENT OF
THE JUVENILE COURT DATED FEBRUARY 13, 1953.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
IN EVIDENCE THE WRITTEN REPORT OF THE
TOOELE COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT.

V. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
A.

The Court Erred In Finding That The Juvenile
Court Permanently Deprived The Natural Parents
Of Custody Of Said Children.

B.

The Court Erred In Making Its Findings Of Fact
10 And 11.

C.

The Court Erred In Making Its Conclusions of Law
1, 2 And 3.

D.

The Court Erred In Failing To Make A Finding As
To Whether The Mother Was, Or Was Not, A Fit
And Proper Person To Have The Custody Of Her
Children.

ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.

A.

The Juvenile Court Had Exclusive Jurisdiction of
The Care, Custody And Control Of The Minor
Children.
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The Juvenile Court was the first one to take jurisdid ion ov<'r the minor children here in question. That
C'onrt, after proper notice, held that the children were
dPpPnd<>nt and neglected. This was on August 31, 1950,
when it entered its order declaring said children dependent and n<>gl<>ded and provided that, subject to the continuing jurisdi<·tion of the court, the children were to be
eomtnitted to the Utah State Department of Public Welfare for foster home care, treatment and supervision (Tr .

.->+, :2-l(i). At the time the original petition for adoption
wa~

filed with the District Court and at the time of the

hearing of thi:-; matter and the entry of the findings,
conclusions and decree from which this appeal is taken,
this decree or order of the Juvenile Court had not been
modified, changed or vacated. The Juvenile Court, under
:-.uch facts, had exclusive jurisdiction of the care, custody
and control of said minor children.
Our statute covering jurisdiction of juvenile courts
provides, in part, as follows:
"55-10-5. Jurisdiction of juvenile courts.The juvenile court shall have ex;clusive original
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect,
dependency and delinquency of children who are
under eighteen years of age, * * * .
(3) When jurisdiction shall have been
acquired by the court in the case of any child,
such child shall continue for the purposes of such
case under the jurisdiction of the court until he
becomes twenty-one years of age, unless dis-
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charged prior thereto or unless he is cmnmitted
to the ~tatP industrial school or to the district
court as hereinafter provided."

Section 55-10-31, Ctal1 Code Annotated 1953, provides for the nwdification of decrees and is as follows:
""55-10-31. .Modification during minority-Inoperative after n1ajority.-No judgment or decree
of the juvenile court shall operate after the child
becomes twent~--one years of age and all orders,
judgn1ents and decrees, except commitments to
the district court or to the state industrial school,
may be modified or revoked by the court at any
time before the child becomes twenty-one years
of age."

Sectiou 55-10-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, sets
forth the proceedings to be followed for the return of
custody of the children to their parents and states, in
part, as follows:
''55-10-41. Proceedings to return custody to
parents.-A parent, guardian or next friend of a
child who has been committed to any children's
aid society or institution * * * may at any time
file with the clerk of the juvenile court a petition
* * * asking for the return of such child to its
parents or guardian, for the reason that they have
reformed or the conditions have changed and that
they are fit and proper persons to have its custody
and are able to support and educate it."

Section 55-10-:"S, Ftah Code Annotated 1953, has been
interpreted and held

h~-

this court to mean that the J uve-

nile Court, having taken jurisdiction properly, has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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exclusive jurisdiction of the care, custody and control of
the <·hildren and continues to have such until changed
~~~· appeal or by its own order. Jensen v. Se1;y, 103 Utah
~:..m, 1:~-t

the

Pa<'. 2d 1081. ln this case all of the judges, with

exc~eption

of Larson and l\1offat, specifically so hold.

.Justice \Yolfe, in his concurring opinion, states:
.. rrhe opinion of Judge Hoyt expresses my
opinion on the reason and interpretation of the
adion of the District Court in refusing to take
jurisdiction of the question raised by the writ of
hahea:- l'orpus and the intention of the District
Court in dismissing the writ. It also expresses my
opinion that where the Juvenile Court has
obtained jurisdiction of a child because of neglect,
dependency or delinquency, the District Court
must di~mi~:-; the writ. It is not discretionary. The
order~ of the Juvenile Court are appealed to this
court under Sec. 1-!-7 -33, ll tah Code Ann. 1943,
and the judgment of the Juvenile Court cannot be
overturned by suing out a writ and obtaining a
hearing on the yery same issue by that method
either in the District or the Supreme Court."
Judge Hoyt states:
"l think it reasonably clear that what the
court did was to hear the habeas corpus matter
and finding that the child involved had been
tak~n into the custody o~ the Juvenile Court, because of neglect or misconduct of the father
(petitioner) and that the juvenile court had
retained jurisdiction of the matter, the district
court concluded, and I think rightly, that it had
no jurisdiction to take the child from the custody
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of the juvenile court or to determine the question
of the father's fitne~~ to haYe his child returned
to hin1.''
.. In n1y opinion it was not a matter of discretion. I think the legislature intended to confer
exclusin' original jurisdiction upon the juvenile
court to detennine such questions in every case
wherein the state had becorne a party by the juvenile court taking custody of a child because of
neglect or delinquency. The provisions of subsection-! of section 1-!-7-4 R.S. relating to powers
of courts to determine questions of custody in
habeas corpus proceedings should not, in my
opinion, be construed to apply to cases in which
the state has become a party by intervention of
the juvenile court. Unless we so construe it we
cannot reasonably give effect to the provision of
subsection 3 of section 14-7-4 that 'When jurisdiction shall have been acquired by the court in
the case of any child, such child shall continue for
the purposes of such case under the jurisdiction
of the court until he becomes twenty-one years of
age, unless discharged prior thereto or unless he
is committed to the state industrial school or to
the district court as hereinafter provided.'"
The case of Chatu·in v. Terry, 107 Utah 340, 153 Pac. 2d
941, affirms this decision.
The State of K_ansas has gone even further and held
that where the District Court obtained original jurisdiction in a divorce case of the custody of children that
thereafter, \vhen the Juvenile Court determined that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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child was a dependent and neglected child, the Juvenile
ourt oui:ited the District Court of the existing jurisdiction. '/'reut v. /ldlwny, (Kan.) 190 Pac. 2d 400:
1

(

"Jt follows that the juvenile court in this case
eould a<'quire jurisdiction of the minor child and
ther<>h~· oust the then existing jurisdiction of the
distric·t court in the divorce action. However this
<'ail only IJ<~ done upon a finding based upon' subHtantial evidence that the child was neglected and
dependent within the statutory definition."
This ('a~e i~ affirmed by the case of Houser v. Houser,
( J(an.) 199 Pac. 2d 497.
In the ea~e of Ross
the court held as follows:

l·.

Ross, (Colo.) 5 Pac. 2d 246,

"The jurisdiction of the divorce court is exercised as between the husband and the wife; that of
the juvenile court 'as between the state, or, so to
speak, the child, and the parents of the child.'
State Y. :\IcCloskey, 136 La. 739, 67 So. 813, 814.
The h\·o courts may have simultaneous, though
not concurrent, jurisdiction concerning the custody of the child. Id. But, where both courts have
made orders concerning such custody, the operation of the order of the divorce court is suspended
during the period, and only during the period,
that the order of the juvenile court remains in
force."
B.

The Natural Parents Had Not Been Permanently
Deprived Of The Custody Of The Minor Children.

The question arises as to what is the meaning of
the words "judicially deprived of the custody of the
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child on account of enwlty, neglect or desertion.'' There
ran be but one meaning to these words and that is that
the parent ha~ been pennanently and absolutely deprived
of the custody of the child. The decree of the Juvenile
Court clearly indicates that this is not the case as it
provides for continuing jurisdiction and that the father
of the children shall furnish support therefor. The
statutes covering Juvenile Courts likewise indicate that
proceedings of the nature of the one presented here do
not conten1plate the pern1anent or absolute divesting of
the custody of a n1inor child from its parents. Section
:35-10-5 (3), Utalz Code Annotated 1953, provides that
the jurisdiction of the court shall continue until the child
becomes twenty-one years of age, unless discharged prior
thereto or committed to the state industrial school or to
the district court. 55-10-32, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
is the section covering the preferred rights of parents to
custody of children and 55-10-41, Utah Code Annotated
1953, is the section covering the procedure to return the

custody of children to their parents, based upon the
ground that the parents have reformed or that conditions have changed and that they are fit and proper
persons to have its custody and are able to support and
educate the child.
The Juvenile Court, by ordering that the father of
the children pay $100.00 per month for their support
and maintenance, clearly indicated that it did not intend
to permanently deprive the parents of custody of said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ehildren. I ,ayJnPnt~ were made by appellant for their
support (Tr. S~>).
In

a goo<l tnan~·

of the statutes of other states there
is a pro\·i~ion, in addition to the one in our statutes, that
pro\' i<l<·:-; t II at it :-;]Ja11 not be n<~eessary to obtain a con:-;Pllt from the father or mother deprived of civil rights
or adjudged guilty of adultery or eruelty and for such
<·au:-;p cliYorced and deprived of the custody of the child,
and hy the great weight of authority the courts of these
different :-;tate:-; have held that sueh a provision does not
do away with the giving of the consent of the parents
nnle:-;:-; the parent has been absolutely deprived of the
('U:-:tody.

Ollsn((l r. Lelmzan, (X. ~lex.) 2-!-3 Pac. 2d 600. In
thi:-; case the lower court approved a petition to adopt
two minor children without the consent of their natural
father, where the mother had procured a divorce from
such father on the ground of cruelty and she had been
awarded eu~tocly of such children, with the father being
granted the right of visitation at reasonable times. The
~ ew ~Iexico statute "~as as follows:

"Section 25-207, N. l\I. S. A., 1941 Comp.,
reads:
(A lPgitimate child cannot be adopted withou.t
tlze consent of its parents, if living together; and
if legally separated, the consent of the parent
having legal custody of the child must be obtained.
It shall not be necessary to obta.in the consent from
a father or mother depri'&'ed of civil rights or ad-
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judged guilty of adultery or crnelty, aud for such
dil.·orced aud deprircd of the custody of
flu> child, or adjudged to be an habitual drunkard,
or who has been judicially deprived of the custody
of the child on accotmt of eruelty to, abandonment
and negled_ of. the child or of infamous conduct.'
( En1phasis supplied.)"

calu,'c

The Appellate court, in reversing the lower court, held
as follows:
"The italicized portion of the statute quoted
above seems to be a common one in many states.
One of the leading cases on the subject is In re
Jackson, 55 Nev. 17-1, 28 P. 2d 125, 129, 91 A. L. R.
1381. The statute and facts in that case are
alnwst identical with the statute and facts we
have here. It is there stated:

'* * * we are of the opinion that where a
divorce is granted for cruelty and the innocent
spouse is awarded the custody of the children (as
in this case), consent of the guilty spouse can
only be dispensed with in a proceeding for adoption of such children when the custody is awarded
to the innocent party without reserving any rights
whatever in the guilty spouse. The custody must
be absolute. To conclude otherwise would be to
attribute to the Legislature a very slight regard
for the great domestic relation of parent and
child. As previously stated, consent lies at the
foundation of adoption statutes. It is so with
our statute. The order of adoption in this case
was void because made without the consent of
respondent.'
There, as here, the guilty spouse had been
given the right to visit the child at reasonable
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times. The case in A. L. R., supra, is followed by
an annotation beginning at page 1387.
The following cases hold under a similar
where the custody of the child is given to
the innocent spouse with right of visitation to the
offending spouse, the consent of the offending
spouse is a pn~n,qui:..;ite to a valid adoption: In
n• ( 'ozza, 1t;:) C'al. :> 1-l-, 126 P. 161, Ann. Cas.
191-l-A, ~1-l-; Bell v. Krauss, 169 Cal. 387, 146
P. S7-l-: ~Iiller v. Higgins, 14 Cal. App. 156,111 P.
-to:~; In re De Leon, 70 Cal. App. 1, 232 P. 738;
fn reLease, 99 Wash. -l-13, 169 P. 816; In re Force
113 \Y ash. 151, 193 P. 698; In re Walker, 170
\\~ a~h. -l-;)-1-, 17 P. :!d 15; Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho
34-9, 180 P. 2d 853 and Stone v. Dickerson, Tex.
Civ. App., 138 ~. "\Y. 2d 200.''

statut<>

In the case of Jackson 'C. Spellman, (Nev.) 28 Pac.
:2cl 125, 91 A. L. R. 1381, the court, in passing upon this
:..;ame question, cites with approval from California, which
court held as follows:
"'\Yhat is meant by this section, and what
was intended by the Legislature, it having in mind
the natural rights of parents, as also the authority
of courts in divorce proceedings to award the
custody of children to either spouse, was that
when a divorce is granted for cruelty (we are only
concerned with this ground here), and the custody of the children is awarded absolutely to the
innocent party, the consent of the guilty one will
not be required in adoption proceedings. It contemplates that by decree of court in such proceedings the court has deprived the guilty spouse
of all right to such custody, and awarded it absolutely to the innocent party. That this is the
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proper interpretation of the section we think reasonably appear.s fron1 the language used in the
section in this sa1ne connection as to consent and
with reference to other proceedings than in
divorce, where it is provided that, when the parent
has been "judicially deprived' of the custody of
the children on account of cruelty or neglect, the
consent of such parent is not necessary. The
Legislature, in providing a 1nethod for adoption,
whereby the legal ties between the parent and the
child should be absolutely severed, could not have
intended to interfere with the authority of the
court in other proceedings involving the custody
of the child, or that the decree of a court in a
divorce proceeding which awarded such custody
to the guilty spouse should be entirely ignored.'
It will be seen that the court in the above case
declined to construe the statute literally and held
that it did not apply except in a case where the
custody of the children had been given absolutely
to the innocent spouse."
.. ~I ore precisely, we are of the opinion that
where a divorce is granted for cruelty and the
innocent spouse is awarded the custody of the
children (as in this case), consent of the guilty
spouse can only be dispensed with in a proceeding
for adoption of such children when the custody
is awarded to the innocent party without reserving any rights whatever in the guilty spouse. The
custody must be absolute. To conclude otherwise:
would be to attribute to the Legislature a very
slight regard for the great domestic relation of
parent and child. As previously stated, consent
lies at the foundation of adoption statutes. It is
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so with our statute. rrhe order of adoption in this
<'ase was void because made without the consent
of re~pondent."
In the <·a~e of Bonck v. Bonck, (Old.) 218 Pac. 2d
902, the <·ourt states:
"'rhe theor~' advanced in support of the first
ground is that the decree of adoption, having been
<'II t Pred by a court of competent jurisdiction and
heing regular on it:-; face, was not open to collateral attack. The theory could be sound only
if the decree of adoption were a judicial act. That
~u('h is not the case we expressly held in Re
Huglw~, SS Okl. :2~)7, 213 P. 79, when, in the syllabu~, we ~tated: 'The adoption of a child is
e.-:~entially a matter of confract between the partiP:-; whose consent is required and is not a judicial proceeding, although the sanction of a judical
officer is required for its consummation.'"
"The statute recognizes that the consent of
both parents, even though divorced, is necessary
to an adoption, unless the divorce was granted
upon the ground of cruelty of ·which the offending
parent had been adjudged guilty. It follows that
it is not the divorcement but the adjudication of
cruelty that is 1nade the basis of rendering the
consent unnecessary. It is the unfitness of the one
so adjudged guilt~T and the absence, by reason
thereof, of that parental fitness necessary in
determining the child's welfare that his or her
consent is not required along with that of the
unoffending parent. It does not follow, however,
that the fact of unfitness so found is one that
necessarily continues or that the court is precluded by such adjudication from inquiring
therein further where it is in the interest of the
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child to do ~o. And where, upon such further
inquiry, the court finds that the offending parent
is fit to haYe the care and eustod~, of such child
and nmkes an award of total or partial custody,
the effect thereof should be to destroy the
force of the fonner adjudication on and after
such finding and a ward, and we hold such to be
the case. \Yith such restoration of the mother to
parental right and competency her consent became
neef's;:.;ar:T to the adoption of the child and since
such consent was not had in the proceedings relied
on, the court did not err in holding same of no
effect."

l

'Ji

C.

Written Consent For Adoption Is Required From
The Natural Mother Or, If Not, From The Juvenile
Court Or Children's Aid Society.

rnless the natural nwther had been permanently
deprived of the custory of her ehildren her written consent was required before a valid adoption could be nmde.

Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Amzotated 1953, provides that
a legitimate child cannot be adopted without consent of
its parents, if living, except the consent is not necessary
frmn.a father or 1nother who has been judicially deprived
of the custody of a child on account of eruelty, neglect
or desertion.
rrhe general rule throughout the majority of states is
that an adoption is in derogation of the common law and
the adoptive statutes should receive strict construction
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and P\'Pr)· intendment should be in favor of the claim of
the pan·nt. J,V('.•;/erltttul u. Croaff, (Ariz.) 198 Pac. 2d
S-t.~:

"·A:-; adoption is in derogation of the common
law, g<'n<'rally speaking it may be said that adopt i \'(~ :-;tat ut<~:-; should receive a strict construction,
particularly \\'ith respect to the jurisdiction of the
court or \\'lt<·n· the effect of the adoption would
he to deprive a natural parent of the possession
of his child. • • •
·~\ltltough tlH· courts tend to construe adoption ~tatute~ to favor the child, it is also true, due
to the resped paid the relationship of parent and
child, that every intendment should be in favor
of the claim of the parent, and where the statute
is open to construction and interpretation, it
should be construed in support of a natural parent
who does not consent to the adoption.' 2 C. J. S.,
Adoption of Children, Sec. 6a.

See also In re \Yehh's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176,
177 P. :2d :2:2:2; Furgeson Y. Jones, 17 Or. 204, 20
P. 8-t.:2, 3 L. R. A. 620, 11 Am. St. Rep. 808; In re
X ewman, SS Cal. ~-\pp. 186, 262 P. 1'112; :Matter
of Cozza. 163 Cal. 31-t., 126 P. 161, Ann. Cas.
191-t.~\, :21-t: In re Jackson, 33 NeY. 17-t, 28 P. 2d
1 :2:>, 91 A. L. R. 1381: 1 Cal. J ul'. 436, Sec. 19.''
Smith r. Smith, (Ida.) 180 Pac. 2d 853:
''Adoption statutes open to construction and
interpretation should be strictly construed and
every intendment taken in favor of the natural
parent not consenting to adoption. As was held
In re Jackson, 55 Nev. 174, 28 P. 2d 1'25, 129, 91
A. L. R. 1381:
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'Tlw eu~todY n1ust be absolute. 11 o conclude
otherwise would. be to attribute to tlw Legislature
a Yery slight regard for the great domestic relation of parent and child. A~ previously stated,
consent lies at the foundation of adoption
statutes: ~,
Jackson

lil

[

l'.

Spellman, (Xe\·.)

:2~

Pac. :2d. 125, 91 A.

L. R. 1381:
"The foregoing cases are illustrative of the
strict con~truction which courts place upon the
provisions in adoption statutes which dispense
with the consent of a child's parents. The consent
of the natural parents lies at the foundation of
~tatutes of adoption. 1 Cal. Juris. p. 436. It ought
not to be dispensed with in response to the mere
letter of a statute, but only when its letter and
~pirit conjoin in showing that such was the plain
intention of the Legislature.
Every intendment should be in favor of the
clain1 of the parent and where the statute is open
to construction and interpretation it should be
construed in support of a naturai parent. In re
Coz;za, supra; 1 Cal. .Juris. p. -t-:37."

."'·

The District Court would not have jurisdiction of
an adoption proceeding unless the consent of the parents
is given, or is not necessary, and the burden of proof is
on the part:· seeking to justify the adoption on the ground
that consent is not necessary. In re Adoption of Stra,u~
ser, ( \\~:·o.) 196 Pac. ~d 862. At page 867 the court
state~:

"Consent lies at the foundation of statutes of
adoption. In re Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 126 P. 161,
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.\nn. Ca~. 1914A, 214-; In re Lem;e, 99 Wash. 413,
1G9 P. su;. Our :;tatutes are esjH~eially clear on
that point. Jn the routine case, the parties con~Pnt or agTPe, and the final act of the court or
judg<> i~ called the 'approval of such agreement
and adoption' ( ~P<·. ;)~-~01), or refusal 'to approve
~u<'h adoption' (~<'<~. ;),~-:Wi".l). The first duty of
tll<' judg<~ is to see that the necessary consents
ar<' gi\'<>n. Ir they are not, the proceeding is at an
<·nd. TIH're is nothing for the judge to approve.
Tl)(•re i~ :-:<'ldom any doubt as to the consent of the
pPr~ons who offer to adopt the children, and the
children often, as in the present case, are too
young to be commlted. The important requirement i:-; the consent of parents ·who have not
abandoned the children. They speak not only for
themselves hut also for the children of whom they
are the natural guardians.
\Vhen a parent refuses to consent, and the
matter in controver;-.:y is whether he had abandoned the child so as to dispense ·with the neces~ity of his consent, the burden of proof is on the
part~· seeking to justify the adoption on that
ground, and the courts often say that the evidence
to show abandonment must be clear and convincing. See In re Bistany, 209 App. Div. 286, 204 N.
Y. S. 599; In re I{elly, 25 Cal. App. 651, 145 P.
1:lG; Petition of Rice, 179 '\Vis. 531, 192 N. W. 56;
..:\Iastrovich v . ..:\f avric, 66 S. D. 577, 287 N. '\V. 97.

It is important to observe the difference between a proceeding in which the court makes a
provisional and temporary order for the custody
of an infant, and an adoption proceeding in which
the final order of approval will absolutely and
permanent!~· sever the natural relation between
parent and child. In a custody case the welfare
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I.

"'::...

of the child under the then existing conditions
1nay be controlling. See Harris Y. ~luir, :2-l: \Vyo.
:213, 1;)1 P. :2(i; I~ennison v. Chokie, 55 \Vyo. -l-:21,
100 r. :2d. ~ll. In an adoption proceeding in whi('h
it is neee:-;~ary for the petitioners to prove that a
parent has abandoned the child, questions in
l't\l2,·a nl to the fitnes~ of the petitioners (Sees. 58:201, ;)~-:20;)) and the welfare of the child (Sec.
;)~-:20D) nre not reached if ahandonn1ent is not
proyed. In re Cozza, supra: In re Lease, supra;
~[atter of Bistany, :239 X. Y. 19, 1-l-:l ~. E. 70;
Connelly Y. Jones, 165 JUl. 544, 110 A. 11-1-; In re
~\nderson, 189 :Minn. 85, :2-l-8 N". \Y. 657; Platt v.
j[oore, Tex. Civ. App., V~:1 S. \Y. :2d 682."

Tr esterlund

r. Croaff, supra:

·· \Ye shall first consider the jurisdiction question which is squarely presented by this record.
Is the consent in writing of the living natural
parents, or the statutory equivalent of such consent, an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to the
exercise of the pmYer of the court in an adoption
proceeding~ Certain well established principles
will be of aid in answering this question:
'As adoption is in derogation of the cmnmon
law, generally speaking it may he said that adoptive statutes should receive a strict construction,
particular!~~ with respect to the jurisdiction of the
court or where the effect of the adoption would
be to deprive a natural parent of the possession
of his child. * * *
'Although the courts tend to construe adoption ~tatutes to favor the child, it is also true, due
to the respect paid the relationship of parent and
child, that every intend1nent should be in favor
of the clai1n of the parent, and where the statute
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is open to construction and interpretation, it
:-:llould he <·on:-:t nw<l in support of a natural parent
who does not <·on:-:<>nt to the adoption.' 2 C.•J. S.,
.Adoption of <~hildren, f;ec. 6a.
~<'e also Jn n• \\'ebb's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176,
171 P. :2d :2:2:2; Furgeson v. Jones, 17 Or. 204, 20
P. ~-+:2, :~ L. H. A. ():20, 11 Am. St. Rep. 808; In re
Newman, SS Cal. A pp. 186, 262 P. 1112; Matter of
Cozza, 1():~ Cal. ;, 1-t, 1~() P. 1G1, Ann. Cas. 1914A,
~1-t-; Jn re J:wb:on, :)5 Ke\·. 174, 2~ P. 2d 125, 91
A. L. R. 1:~s 1 ; 1 Cal. J ur. 436, Sec. 19."

.. The language of the statute being plain and
unambiguous, we hold that under our law consent
in writing of the living natural parents, or its
~tatutory ettuivalent, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid adoption. This principle is stated
in ~ C. J. ~., Adoption of Children, Sec. 18:
'l'on~ent of the parties to an adoption, where
required by the statute, is a jurisdictional fact and
"·ithout it a valid order of adoption cannot be
made * *'' ~, •• ~eP also ~ee. 21-a ( 1) Ibid.

The court in the instant case, there being a
lack of eon~ent, by express!~· finding an absence of
the only alleged statutory equivalent, automatically deprived itself of the right to proceed further
with the hearing. Jurisdiction cannot be made to
hinge upon a finding as to the 'best interests' of
the child. It would be an idle thing for the trial
court to proceed to take further testi1nony in the
case on this latter point where the jurisdiction to
grant the adoption no longer existed. Renck v.
Superior Court of Maricopa County, 66 Ariz. 320,
187 P. 2d 656."
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:.(

13lU

j!'

end'

In thi~ ea~e the adopting parents certainly have not
carried the burden of proof to show that the nwther was
permanently judicially deprived of the custody of her
minor children. The only evidence offered in this connection is the decree of the Juvenile Court which has the
continuing jurisdiction provision contained therein, and
to refute the question that this wa8 to permanently
deprive her of the custody there are the letters written
by Judge F. ~1. Alder, introduced in evidence by appellant as Exhibits "l'' and ":2'', which clearly demonstrate
that the Juvenile Court did not intend to permanently
deprive the rnother of custody of said children. In the
letter of February 10, 1951 ~lr. Alder rnade the following
statement: "Of course, your future prospects and conduct will detennine the results as to the children." (Tr.
:2-±-±), while in the letter of :Jiay 11, 1951, which he signed
as Judge of the Juvenile Court, he made the following
statements:
"As to your children, don't worry about them
because the gossip about adoption by July cannot be anything but gossip and you do not need
to worry about that as there is no tirne, within a
reasonable time, that such procedure ever occurs.
The best advice I can give ~'OU at the present
time is that you try to rnake your present marriage a success and let the future take care of
itself as it comes along. Your children are in
good hands so that you need not worry about their
heing cared for." ( Tr. 243).
The evidence also indicates that ~irs. Brown was.
pennitted to see the children on at least one occasion
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and wa:-; advi:-;<>d not to visit them on other occasions
IH·<·au:-;e it would IH· detrimental to the (·hildren (rrr. 78).
But li<'V('l' was she informed by the Juvenile Court or
h~· <lll~' of th(' well'are workers that she had been deprived
ol' tlw right of her children permanently and that she
could not ag·ain seek cu:-;tody of the children. In fact,
:-;IH~ paid for their :-;upport pursuant to the .Juvenile Court
decree ( rrr. s:-)).
If the court ean, b~· any justification, hold that the
consent of thP natural mother was not necessary, the
Distric-t Court ~till did not have jurisdiction to grant
the adoption without obtaining the consent and approval
of the Juvenile Court. 8 ection 5:5-10-40, Utah Code Annotated 1D:3.'J, provides that upon order of the Juvenile
Court a child may he committed to a children's aid society
or institution, that such society shall he considered the
guardian and that such society and institution, under the
direction of the court and subject to its approval, may
provide suitable homes for such children. Section 55-1043, Ctah Code Annotated 1953, then provides that in the
event such society or institution secures a suitable home
for the legal adoption of children committed to its care
it shall report such to the court and the court, after an
examination, shall authorize such society or institution
to :-;Penre for such children legal adoption.
\Y. e are of the opinion that the Utah State Depart-

Inent of Public Welfare is not a children's aid society
with this power to place children for adoption under our
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~tatntt' il8

under Section .>:>-10-6', Utah Code A11notnted
19.>3, a children's ai4 society "shall mean any duly
organized ~oeiet~~ incorporated under the laws of this
::;tate and having- anwng- its objects the protection of
children frmn cruelty, and the care and control of delinquent, neglected and dependent children. The articles of
incorporation of eyery such ~ociet:~ n1ust specifically proYide that any abuse of the rights granted under the provisions of this chapter shall subject such corporation to
an action hy the attorney-general, under the provisions
of chapter 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure." However,
if the Utah
~o

~tate

Departn1ent of Public \Velfare can be

classified, in order to perfect an adoption it required

the approval of the Juvenile Court, which was not obtained in the case of either of the children under discus~ion,

and therefore the District Court under no circum-

Etances had jurisdiction to even pass upon the question
as to whether it was for the best interests of the children
to be adopted and to enter its decrees of adoption.
II. THE WELFARE OF A CHILD IS NOT THE
PARAMOUNT ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE COURT
HAS JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY TO PERMIT AN
ADOPTION.

The District Court in these matters clearly indicates
hy its findings of fact and conclusions of law in each
case that it was upon its finding that it would be to the
best interests of the children that they be adopted and
that the natural 1nother be deprived of her own children
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that it Pnt<·n•d iti-i decree~ of adoption. This is pointed
out in finding-H 10 and 11 and conclusion 2, which are as
follow~:

"1 0. 'l,hat the health of said minor child
would be endang-ered, pll:·:..;icall.Y and mentally, by
a11:· <·ilangt> of <'u~tody and that it would be a
p~:·<·ilologi<'al risk and detrimental to the physical,
elllotional and moral health and stability of the
~aid minor child to return her to her natural
mother, who had since remarried and who with
her pn·~<·nt husband i:-: not now known to said
minor child." ( Tr. 19).

"11. That the physical, emotional and moral
health and stability of said minor child, her
~ecnrity and be:-:t intere~t~, will best be promoted
by such adoption prayed for in the petition herein." (Tr. 19) .
... >
That it would be to the best interests of
:-;aid minor child that a decree be entered in favor
of :-;aid petitioners, * * *, for the adoption of said
child." (Tr. 19).

X o where in the finding:-: or conclusions or decree is
it determined that the natural mother of these children
wa:-; not a fit and proper person to have the care, custody
and control of said children. The law is well established
that the natural parents have a paramount right to their
children if they are fit and proper persons to·have such
custody. In the case of H mres L'. Cohen) (Cal.) 255 Pac.
2d 761, the court held:

"It has been held repeatedly that, while the
best interests of an illegitimate child is the important factor, the parents of such a child have a
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I~

~uperior claint as against the world to his custody
if the:- a rp fit and proper. Armstrong v. Price,
~Io. .\ pp., :2~l:2 ~. \V. -l--l-7, mother; Jensen v.
Earlp:-, G3 rtah 60-l-, :2:2~ P. :217, mother; In re
n ille, supra, t):'l Cal. App. G17, :2:2-l- P. 7~-l-, nwther;
E:\: parte \\~allace, :2() X. ~1. 1~1. 190 P. 1020,
father; Garrett v. ~Iahaley, 199 ~~\ln. 606, 75 So.
10, father; Le\Yis Y. Crowell, :210 Ala. 199, 97 So.
G91, father; People ex rel. ~len•dith v. l\[eredith,
supra, :2j:2 .:\pp. Div. j~), 69 N. Y. ~. 2d 462,
affirmed :2~)7 X. Y. (i9:2, 17 X. E. 2d 8; State v.
XP~taYnl, 1:2 :Jiinn. -!15, 7:1 X. \Y. 7:23; Jackson v.
Luckie, :205 Ga. 100, 3:2 ~- E. :2d :1SS; Ex parte
~ch\\-artzkopf, 1-!9 X eb. -!60, 31 N. W. 2d 29-!; Ex
parte :Malley, 131 X. J. Eq. -!0-!, 25 A. :2d 630;
French v. Catholic Com1nunity League, 69 Ohio
.\pp. J.--!-:2, -!-! N. E. :2d 113; Cmn. ex rei. Hyman v.
Hyman, 1G~b Pa. Super. 6-!, 63 A. 2d 4-l-7; Templeton v. \Valker, Tex. Civ. App., 179 S. \V. 2d 811;
Henderson v. Henderson, 187 V a. 121, 46 S. E. 2d
10: Petition of Dickholtz, 341 Ill. App. 400, 94 N.
E. :2d 89; 7 Am. Jur., Bastards, Sees. 61-66; 10
C. J. S., Bastards, Sec. 17; Pierce v. Jeffries, 103
\Y. Va. -l-10, 137 S. E. 651, 51 A. L. R. 1507. The
::'Ullll' rule has been applied ·with respect to the
custody of legiti1nate children. Civ. Code, Sec.
197; Roche ,,.... Roche, 25 Cal. :2rl 141, 152 P. 2d
999; Stever v. Stever, 6 Cal. 2d 166, 56 P. 2d 1229;
ea~es cited 13 Cal. J ur. 153-5."

"Hence extreme caution must be observed in
depriving a parent of the custody of his child.
If he is fit, the child should not be taken from him
by vague applications of the concept that the best
interests of the child come first. Otherwise there
is no lin1it to the extent courts ma:- go. They may
base parental deprivation of custody on what they
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<·on:-;id<·r hett<> r financial or social standing, edu<·a t ional background, nationality, race, or religion,
<'i<'., although the fitnP~~ of the parent is apparent.
l\lend.Y }J(•c·au:-;<~ some other person may he more
fit should not he a ha~i~ for defeating the parent's
natural right. If without finding the parent unfit
t liP gPn<'ral conclusion is reached that the best
int<·rP~t~ of the <·hild require that a stranger be
his c·11~todian, the necessary hypothesis is that
although the parent was fit, the court decided
someone PI~<· was more fit. That means that the
stat<· acting through its courts may completely
eliminate all parental rights. The next step would
be for the state to assume complete and arbitrary
power over children (·ontran· to the principles
<>nunciated in the Lerner, Prince and ~Ieyer cases,
supra. Our conclusion does not mean that the
child is a chattel belonging to the parent nor that
the state does not have a vital concern in the welfare of the child and the right to make regulations
in that field. Rather it gives protection to the
parent's right of custody which is founded upon
the importance of the family relationship in this
eountry."

In re Sclnnd/s Adojdion, (Pa.) 50 Atl. 2d 504:
.. Judge ICeller said, at page 308 of 113 Pa.
Super., at page 749 of 173 A.: 'Unless the requisite
consents declared by the act of assembly to be
necessary are obtained, or there is a specific finding that both the father and the mother of the
children have abandoned them, a decree of adoption cannot be entered. The welfare of the children is not sufficient ground for the decree of
adoption, unless based on the necessary consent of
the parents, or on the distinct finding that the
parent or parents not consenting have abandoned
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the children. Tlw fad that the adoption asked
for may he adYan tagPon~ to the children and for
their umterial welfare i~ not to be considered by
the court until the 11eee~~a r:· prerequisites for
such action exist.'
\Ye are therefore required to reverse the decree here appealed frmn, but expressly withhold
any decision as to the custody of the child, a lnatter not now before ns."

In re .Adoption of D ______ .... ____ , (Ftah) :!5:! Pac. 2d 223:

1:

...

]·

!_,.

"Third: The \velfare of the child. That parenb ha,-e the pri1nary and ~nperior right to the
custody of their offspring above all others is not
open to question; nor is it suggested that anyone
may take a child away fron1 a natural parent
1nerely because he can offer the child better advantages than the natural parent could provide.
Xevertheless, when questions of child custody
arise, the welfare of the child and her chances for
a suitable hon1e environment and advantages in
nurture, training and education to the end that she
may live and be conditioned for a well adjusted,
happy and useful life are i1nportant factors to consider. In fact, it is often stated that such considerations are of the parmnount importance. However, this is modified by the presumption that the
welfare of the child will best be subserved by being
in the custody of its natural parent."

In rc Adoption of Walton, (Utah) 259 Pac. 2d 881:
"Courts have not hesitated to build a strong
fortress around the parent-child relation, and
have stocked it with ammunition in the form of
established rules that adds to its in1pregnability.
To sever the relationship successfully, one must
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have abandoned the <·hild, and such abandonment
mu~t he with a :-;pe<'ifie intent so to do,-an intent
to :-;<•ver all eorrelative rights and duties incident
to tlH· relationship. ~ueh intent must be proved
I>~· him who ass<'rts it, by proof that not only prepond<·rat<'s, hut which must be clear and satisl'ador~·,-~·;omething akin to that degree of proof
JH'<'Ps~ar~· to establish an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or, as one authority puts it 'by clear
and indubitable evidence.' The relationship has
been considered a bundle of human rights of such
fundamental importance as to lead courts frequent!~· to ~a~· that consent is at the foundation
of adoption statutes, that evidence pertaining to
it lllnst he appraised in a light most favorable to
him whose parental right is assaulted, that adoption statutes being in derogation of the common
law are to be construed strictly in favor of the
parent and the preservation of the relationship,
(although not the rule in rtah) and that all
doubts are resolved against its destruction. The
authorities haYe gone so far in their protection of
these kinship rights as to hold that an abandonment, eYen though a fait accompli, can be the subject of repentance, absent vested rights in others.
Oft times it is pointed out that abandonment,
within the meaning of adoption statutes, must be
conduct evincing 'a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
to the child.' In defense of the relationship are
authorities which refuse to accept 'abandonment'
as synonymous with 'non-support' under adoption
statutes, although non-support may be an important factor in establishing an abandon1nent. So
jealously guarded is the parent-child relation that
uniformly it is held that the abandonment or desertion firmly must be established by the type
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l~;

-..i';".

of proof \H:' 1nention, before any question as to
the best interests or welfare of the child can be
the subject of inquiry. The ilnportance of preserving the relationship clearly is pointed up when one
considers the well-established concept that custody 1nay be awarded in a proper case, while the
courts 1nay have no power to sever the relation~hip.-accounting for the principle that the welfare of the child is of great in1portance in custody
<·ase~, but quite inunaterial in adoption cases until an effective abandonment of parental rights
i~ shown. \Yere the rule otherwise, and an indisrriminate sanction of the dispossession of parental
rights without consent were atte1npted, serious
constitutional impedimenta no doubt would loom
large under the due process clause."
III. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
IN EVIDENCE THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE AND JUDGMENT OF
THE JUVENILE COURT DAT'ED FEBRUARY 13, 1953.

There \Yas offered in evidence the findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree and judg1nent of the J uvenile Court, ·which involved a hearing to determine whether
the two older children, nan1ely: Larry Deveraux and
Blaine Deveraux, should be returned to the custody of
their mother or their mother and father. In the findings,
conclusions and decree the court found, concluded and
decreed that the n1other, Rhea Walker Brown, fonnerly
Rhea Walker Deveraux, and the father, Ellis Deveraux,
had changed their course of conduct sufficiently for the
better to justify the return of said children to them on
a trial ha~is. A portion of the findings is as follows:

'~
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"Tlwt ~I r. Brown is willing to take the said
children, Larry Deveraux and Blaine Deverau;x.,
into tlJ<• Brown home and care and provide for
the said dtildren; that the mother, Rhea Brown
lw:-; changed her courH~ of conduct for the better
and her present conduct appears to qualify her
to a:-;:-:uJJJ<• tll<' care and custody of said children,
• • *.'' (Tr. 118-122).
The deere<•, in part,

~tates

as follows:

"lrl, IS THEREFORE ADJ[DGED AND
IH:CHJ<:ED by the Court that the care, control
and <·u;-;to<l:• of the said children at the ·end of this
school term, shall be returned to their mother,
Rhea 'Valker Brown, formerly Rhea Walker Deveraux, subject to the continuing jurisdiction of
the Court;***.'' (Tr.123-125).
The Juvenile Court is a court of competent jurisdiction in connection with the care, custody and control
of the minor children and its findings and decree as to
the fitness of their mother, unless appealed from, become
res judicata and binding upon the District Court. The
findings, conclusions and judgment and decree of the
Juvenile Court were certainly competent, material and
relevant evidence in the issues on the adoption proceedings and it was error for the court to refuse their admission in evidence.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
IN EVIDENCE THE WRITTEN REPORT OF THE
TOOELE COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT.

The court erred in refusing to admit in evidence
the written report on appellant dated December 11, 1952,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
from the Tooele County Department of Publie \Velfare
for the reason that ~aid report was made to the .Juvenile
Court at the time appellant requested the return of her
two older children to her. This report contained the following ~tatement:
.. X o doubt, there was a time in nr n;. Brown's
life when she "·as not a fit n10ther, and :·ou are
better acquainted with these facts than I am.
Xevertheless, I can honestly sa:· that since her
marriage to :J[r. Brown and during the past year,
her behavior has been above reproach. She takes
excellent care of her home and her baby, as can be
verified by anyone in Stockton. I can find no
cause to deprive her of the custody of her children at tllis time." (Tr. 116).
This evidence was clearly 1naterial to show that appellant had changed her way of life and was a fit and
proper person to have the custody of her 1ninor children.
V. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
A.

..,_,

The Court Erred In Finding That The Juvenile
Court Permanently Deprived The Natural Parents
Of Custody Of Said Children.

The court erred in entering its finding of fact 2,
which is as follows:
"·) That on or about the 31st day of August,
1950, the .Juvenile Court of the Third District, in
and for 1~tah County, State of Ftah, determined
that the said natural parents of said child are unfit and improper persons to have her care, custody
and control and signed and entered its Decree and
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.J udglll<'lli dec·laring and adjudging the ~aid Diane
I )<'\'<'raux to he a dependent and neglected <'hild
\\'ithin tlH· weaning of the laws of Utah and perlllanen tl ~· dqn·iving the aforesaid natural parents
of the <·u~tod~· of ~aid child and committed said
ehild to til<> t:tah ~tatP Department of Public Well'a n• for l'o~t<·r home care, treatment, and supervi~ion." ('rr. 17),
and particular}~· the portion 'and permanently depriving
the afore~aid natural pan·nt~ of the custody of said
child."
A~ wP have heretofore pointed out under point IB,
the evidence conclu~ively ~lwws that the Juvenile Court
did not permanently depriYe the parents of the custody
of their childrPll, and :-:ince the matter has been fully dis<·u:-::-:Pd before we will not make any further comments
thereon.

The Court Erred In Making Its Findings Of Fact
10 And 11.

B.

\Ye contend that findings 10 and 11, which are as
follows:
"10. That the health of said minor child
would be endangered, physically and mentally,
b~' an~, change of custody and that it would be a
psychological risk and detrll:nental to the physical, emotional and moral health and stability of
the said minor child to return her to her natural
mother, who has since remarried and who with
her present husband is not now known to said
1ninor child." (Tr. 19).
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"11. That the physieal, emotional and 1noral
health and stabilitY of ~aid 1ninor ehild, her seenrity and best interests, will best be promoted
by such adoption prayed for in the petition herein." ( Tr. 19).
are not supported by the evidence. This question has
been disenssed previously under point II.

)~_

EL

The findings completely ignore the presun1ption that
it will be to the hest interests of a child to be with its
natural parents if they are fit and proper persons and
attempt to make the sole issue involved in the adoption
proceedings the question of \Yhat would be the best interests of the child regardless of parental rights.
C.

The Court Erred In Making Its Conclusions of Law
1, 2 And 3.

The conclusions of law 1, 2 and 3 are as follows:
.. 1. That the decree of the Juvenile Court
judicially and permanently deprives the natural
parents of said minor child of the custody of said
child on account of neglect of said natural parents." (Tr. 19).
··2. That it would be to the best interests of
said 1ninor child that a decree be entered in favor
of said petitioners, * * *, for the adoption of said
child." (Tr. 19).
'"3. That the prayer of the petition should be
granted." (Tr. 20).
\Ye are of the opinion that the error of making these
eonelll~ion~

is

full~~

covered under points IB and II.
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D.

The Court Erred In Failing To Make A Finding As
To Whether The Mother Was, Or Was Not, A Fit
And Proper Person To Have The Custody Of Her
Children.

rrhe <'OUI'l :-;}tould have lllade a finding On the fitness
ol' the lttotil<'r to have the care, custody and control of
l1Pr children, ot]J<'rwi~<~ it Hhould have excluded all evidt>nce relating to that subject and to the question as to
the heHt intereHts of the child unless some question had
been rai~<·d that the child would not properly fit into the
enYiromnent of the adopting parents or that the adopting
parents were not fit and proper persons to have the care
and custody of said children.
\Ya~

mother

notice of the adoption proceedings given to the

purel~·

for the purpose of protesting that the

adopting parents "·ere not proper or that it would not be
for the best interests of the children to be adopted by
such parties t \Yas not notice given so that she might
present to the court her fitness for the care, custody and
control of the children, particularly where she has never
given her

consent~

we cannot see

wh~·

Or if consent of no one was needed,
notice should then be given.
CONCLUSION

-

In conclusion we respectfully submit that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to pass upon the
adoption of these children for the reason that no consent
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"·as eYer giYen in accordance with the law of this state
or otherwise, and this court should sd aside, vaeate and
annul the decrees of adoption heretofore entered and
make such other further order as may be proper in the
premises.
Respectfully sub1nitted,

GL;STIX, RICHARDS & l\IATTSSON,
Attorneys for Rhea \Valker Brown,

Protestant and Appellant.
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